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1- STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellee Sunshine Precious Metals, Inc. filed its voluntary
petition in bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Idaho on March 9, 1992, Case No. 92-00749, and is
currently the subject of a proceeding under Chapter 11 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, this court cannot
exercise jurisdiction over Sunshine Precious Metals, Inc. The
Statement of Jurisdiction contained in the Brief of Appellant is
otherwise correct.
11• ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the district court correctly granted partial summary
judgment in favor of Appellees Sunshine Mining, Inc., Sunshine
Precious Metals, Inc. and HMC Mining, Inc. Specifically:
1. Whether the district court correctly concluded that the
Burgin Lease does not require the lessee to do more work than the
"Minimum Annual Work" provision of the lease expressly requires;
and
2. Whether the district court correctly concluded that the
Unit Lease does not require the lessee to do more work than the
"Minimum Work Requirements" provision of the lease expressly
requires.
In reviewing the granting of a motion for summary judgment,
this court utilizes the same standard applied by the trial courts,
prescribed by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), which provides
that:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Summary judgment is proper when the defendant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on the material, undisputed facts. See
Payne v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186, 188 {Utah 1987); see also Norton v.
Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983). The mere allegations of
a pleading cannot serve to create issues of fact for the purpose of
opposing a motion for summary judgment. See D & L Supply v.
Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989) (original complaint and
answer insufficient to defeat motion for summary judgment); see
also Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224, 226 (Utah 1983) (allegations
in non-movant's answer did not put facts in issue); Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.
This is an appeal from the granting of a partial summary
judgment in a case arising out of alleged breaches of mining
leases.
B. Course of Proceedings
Appellee Sunshine Precious Metals, Inc. filed its voluntary
petition in bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Idaho on March 9, 1992, Case No. 92-00749, and is
- 2 - i
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currently the subject of a proceeding under chapter 11 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, proceedings in this
court as to Appellee Sunshine Precious Metals, Inc. are stayed
pursuant to section 362 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (11
U.S.C. § 362). Otherwise, Sunshine Mining Company ("Sunshine") and
HMC Mining, Inc. ("HMC") have no objection to the statement of the
course of proceedings in the Brief of Appellants. Sunshine and HMC
have used the same shortened titles for documents used by Chief and
South Standard in the Brief of Appellants.
C. Disposition in District Court.
Sunshine and HMC have no objection to Chief's and South
Standard's statement of the disposition in the district court.
IV. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS.
A. Overview of Undisputed Facts
The East Tintic Mining District ("the District") is located
in Utah and Juab Counties, near the town of Eureka. The District
contains several significant underground ore bodies bearing silver,
lead, zinc, gold, and other metals. (Complaint, «[ 8 (R. 34);
Answer, ^8 (R.76).)
In 19 56, Chief, South Standard, and their predecessors in
interest owned most of the land in the East Tintic Mining District.
These companies collectively leased their lands to Bear Creek
Mining Company, a subsidiary of Kennecott Copper Corporation, under
a Leases and Unit Agreement ("the Unit Lease"). Under the Unit
- 3 -
Lease, Bear Creek acquired a fifty-year mining tenancy on the
10,0 00 acre "Unit Tract." Additionally, each lessor acquired a
royalty interest in the ores mined from every other lessor's
property. (Complaint, «[9 (R. 34); Answer, ^9 (R.76 ).)
The Burgin Ore Body containing silver, lead and zinc, was
mined by Kennecott pursuant to the Unit Lease. (Complaint, flll
(R.33); Answer, flll (R.75).) Kennecott also operated the Trixie
Mine under the Unit Lease. The Trixie ores contain gold and
silver. (Complaint, ^[13 (R. 33); Answer, fll3 (R. 75-74).)
Kennecott ceased operations at the Burgin Mine in 1978. On
October 15, 1980, Chief leased the Burgin Tract (after the Burgin
Tract had been severed from the remainder of the Unit Tract) to
Sunshine Mining Company under a Mining Lease and Agreement ("the
Burgin Lease") . (Complaint, f^[16, 17 (R.32) ; Answer, f516, 17
(R.74-73).)
In April of 1983, Kennecott conveyed all of its interest in
the Unit Lease to HMC. Sunshine Mining Company subsequently
acquired all of the stock of HMC. Since that time, Sunshine
Precious Metals, Inc. has conducted operations on the Unit Tract.
(Complaint, ^19 (R.32); Answer, ^[19 (R.73) .)
Sunshine Mining Company became the lessee of the Burgin Tract
in 1980; HMC became the lessee of the Unit Tract in 1983; by June
of 198 3, Chief was the sole lessor of the Burgin Tract; and by
June of 1983, Chief and South Standard were the sole lessors of the
Unit Tract. (Complaint, T[fl9, 20 (R.32); Answer, 5519, 20 (R.73);
_ 4 -
iExhibit "A" to Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 1 (R.855).)
The Burgin Lease
The Burgin Lease contains the following provisions:
2.3 Chief acknowledges that during the term of
this Lease all decisions with respect to the character
of the work performed thereon by Sunshine under the
terms of this Lease shall be solely those of Sunshine,
whose only obligation to Chief in this regard is that
such work will be performed in a sound miner-like
manner.
(Exhibit "A" to Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 3
(R.853)(emphasis added).)
Section 5. Manner of Work: Minimum Annual Work.
5.1 All exploration and development work and all
mining on the property shall be performed by Sunshine
m a sound miner-like manner, and except as to the
amount of minimum annual work required by Section 5.2.
the amount and character of all work shall be in the
sole and absolute discretion of Sunshine.
5.2 Sunshine shall expend at least the following
sums m exploration and development on or for the
benefit of the property during the periods indicated:
January l, 1981 through December 31,
1981, $100,000 and a like sum for each year
thereafter until net smelter return royalties
are payable to Chief.
(Exhibit "A" to Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 5
(R.851))(emphasis added).) Sunshine has complied fully with
Section 5.2 of the Burgin Lease. (Chief's Brief in Opposition at
7 (R.1066); Brief of Appellants at 20-21.)
The Burgin Lease also contains the following provision:
Sunshine shall provide all funds as it in its sole
m ining judgment deems necessary for the exploration,
- 5 -
development and mining of the property.
(Exhibit "A" to Sunshine *s Memorandum in Support at. 6
(R.850)(emphasis added).)
Additionally, the Burgin Lease contains the following
provisions:
7.1 Sunshine shall pay the following
royalties to Chief:
7.1.2 Commencing on January 1, 1982 and on
January 1 of each year thereafter, an advance
royalty of $100,000.
(Exhibit "A" to Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 6 (R.850).)
Sunshine Precious Metals, Inc. has complied fully with Section
7.1.2 of the Burgin Lease. (Chief's Brief in Opposition at 7
(R.1066); Brief of Appellants at 12.)
The Burgin Lease also contains the following provision:
15.3 In the event Sunshine fails to perform the
minimum work required by Section 5, the sole remedy of
Chief shall be termination of this Lease, and Chief
expressly waives any claim for damages it may have
against Sunshine for Sunshine's failure to perform such
work.
(Exhibit "A" to Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 11
(R.845)(emphasis added).)
The Burgin Lease provides at Section 19.2 that it "shall be
governed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State
of Idaho." (Exhibit "A" to Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 12
(R.844).)
The Unit Lease
Article V of the Unit Lease contains the following provision:
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tIn consideration of the foregoing leases, [Lessee]
does hereby covenant and agree with the Lessors as
follows:
1- Minimum Work Requirements. (a) During each
of the first five years from the date hereof to expend
on exploration, development and mining operations the
sum of $100,000 a year on such portions of the land in
the Unit Tract as it shall deem advisable in order to
determine the probability of the presence of
merchantable ores therein and to develop and mine the
same. . . . Beginning in the seventh year and
continuing through the life of this lease and any
extension thereof, unless waived by the application of
the waiver clause in subparagraph 1(d) of this Article
V, [Lessee]*s minimum annual obligation to expend shall
likewise be $100,000 ....
(Exhibit "B" to Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 8-9 (R.825-
824)(emphasis added).) Sunshine Precious Metals, Inc. has complied
with the minimum expenditure requirement of Article V, Section 1 of
the Unit Lease. (Brief of Appellants at 39.)
Article VI, Section 9 of the Unit Lease reads as follows:
Integration of Agreement - Amendments. This
Agreement constitutes the whole agreement between the
parties. There are no terms, obligations, covenants or
conditions other than contained herein. No variation
thereof shall be deemed valid unless signed by the
parties representing 75% or more of the total acreage
of the Unit Tract with the same formality as this
Agreement.
(Exhibit "B" to Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 24
(R.809)(emphasis added).)
B. Contested Fact Issues Improperly Cited By Appellants
In Appellants' Brief, Chief and South Standard have asserted
as fact numerous allegations that are not supported by depositions,
answers to interrogatories, admissions on file or affidavits as
required by Rule 56(c). The allegations of fact which Sunshine and
- 1 -
HMC contest are set forth in Exhibit "A" attached hereto. Those
assertions were not before the district court in its consideration
of the motion for partial summary judgment and cannot be considered
by this court because they are outside the scope of Rule 56(c).
Those assertions are prejudicial, and should be stricken from the
Brief of Appellants and disregarded by this court.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) allows the courts to
consider only depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions
on file, affidavits and uncontroverted allegations of the
pleadings. Controverted allegations of the pleadings cannot be
considered. See Guardian State Bank v. Humpherys, 762 P.2d 1084,
1086 (Utah 1988)(party opposing summary judgment must provide
specific facts, and allegations from a pleading are insufficient);
see also Hall v. Fitzgerald. 671 P.2d 224, 226 (Utah 1983)
(allegations in non-movant's answer did not put facts in issue).
The United States Supreme Court similarly has held that a summary
judgment may
be opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials
listed in [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 56(c),
except the mere pleadings themselves, and it is from
this list that one would normally expect the nonmoving
party to make the showing to which we have referred.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Chief's and
South Standard•s assertions are not proper summary judgment
evidence, are inflammatory and prejudicial, in many cases are
untrue, and should be stricken from the Brief of Appellants and
disregarded by this court.
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court correctly concluded that the Burgin and
Unit leases do not require the lessees to do more work than is
expressly required by leases' minimum work provisions. Imposing
additional obligations would be contrary to the express covenants
of the leases and would frustrate the intent of the parties.
Chief and South Standard claim that every mining lease
imposes on the lessee a duty to engage in a "reasonable" level of
exploration, development and mining activity, regardless of any
provisions expressly establishing the required levels or amount of
such activities. Chief and South Standard also contend that the
lessees must perform a "reasonable" amount of work since the Burgin
and Unit leases expressly require the conduct of raining activity in
a "minerlike" or "miner-like" manner and require that the lessee
"remove, insofar as practicable and consistent with good mining
practice, all commercial ore encountered," even though the
imposition of such unquantifiable work requirements would nullify
the express terms of each lease.
Contrary to the arguments advanced by Chief and South
Standard, no court has ever implied obligations contrary to a
contract's express covenants. Significantly, every case cited by
Chief and South Standard holds that contractual obligations will be
implied only in the absence of express covenants to the contrary.
The courts must not imply covenants hostile to the express
provisions of written contracts because to do so would undermine
- 9 -
the law of contracts and leave contracting parties devoid of
certainty in performing their contractual obligations.
The parties to these leases have reduced their agreements to
writing and have specified in those written agreements the rights
and duties of each party. This court should now enforce the intent
of the parties as expressed in the plain language of the leases.
VI. ARGUMENT
A. The district court correctly concluded that no implied
covenant requires the lessees to do more exploration, development
or mining work than is specifically required by the express minimum
work provisions of the Burgin and Unit leases.
No implied covenant requires the lessees to perform more work
than is specifically required by the express, written minimum work
provision of each lease, because the courts do not judicially imply
obligations that are contrary to the express agreements of the
parties.
The courts consistently and without exception have held that
express contractual agreements preclude the judicial implication of
covenants that are contrary to the parties' express agreements.
See Rip Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd. , 618 P. 2d 497, 505 (Utah
1980) (the contracting parties' express agreement "excludes the
possibility of an implied covenant of a different or contradictory
nature"); Meagher v. Uintah Gas. Co. f 185 P.2d 747, 752 (Utah
1947)(when specific exploration provisions were set forth in lease,
court would find no other such provisions because parties'
intentions were found in "the provisions they [had] included in
- 10 -
their contract"); Ted R. Brown and Associates, Inc. v. Carnes
CorP- > 753 p-2d 964, 970 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("a court may not
enforce asserted rights not supported by the contract itself");
Archer v.—Mountain Fuel Supply Co. . 642 P. 2d 94 3, 94 5 (Idaho
1982)(express contractual provision that there were no other
agreements between parties except for two written contracts
precluded implication of a separate, implied covenant) ; J^ R^
Simplot Co.—v, Chambers, 350 P.2d 211, 214 (Idaho 1960) (court
refused to limit contracting party's discretion to assign its
contract rights by implying a requirement that its choice of
assignee be "reasonable"); Triangle Mining Co. v. Stauffer Chemical
Co^, 753 F.2d 734, 739-40 (9th Cir. 1985)(implied covenant of good
faith in mining lease may not impose duties which conflict with
express provisions); Brimmer v. Union Oil Co. of California. 81
F.2d 437, 440 (10th Cir. 193 6)("express covenant upon a given
subject excludes the possibility of an implied covenant of a
different or contradictory nature").
Perhaps the clearest articulation of this rule is that
expressed by this court in Rio Algom Corp.. where the court said:
It is fundamental that, whether expressed or not,
every contract includes a covenant of good faith with
respect to dealings between the parties. The parties
to a contract must deal fairly and honestly with each
other, h court will not, however make a better
contract for the parties than they have made for
themselves. . . . An express agreement or covenant
relating to a specific contract right excludes the
possibility of an implied covenant of a different or
contradictory nature.
618 P.2d at 505 (emphasis added).
- 11 -
The Idaho Supreme Court in J. R. Simplot Co., cited by this
court in Rio Algom Corp., similarly said:
To construe [the contract] as restricting the
right to assign to a corporation which may be by
appellants considered "reasonable" would necessitate
the insertion of words and the making by the Court of
a new contract. This we cannot do. Courts cannot make
for the parties better agreements than they themselves
have been satisfied to make, and by a process of
interpretation relieve one of the parties from the
terms which he voluntarily consented to . . . ."
Rio Algom Corp., 618 P.2d at 505 (quoting J. R. Simplot Co., 350
P.2d at 214)(emphasis added).
No case cited by Chief and South Standard supports their
argument that an express contractual agreement can be nullified by
an implied covenant. Although Chief cites cases and other
authorities for the proposition that mining leases contain implied
covenants requiring reasonable diligence by the lessee, not one of
those cases involved a lease containing an express covenant dealing
with the amount of work required of the lessee or imposing any time
constraints on the lessee's performance. Instead, each case cited
by Chief involves a lease or contract that was silent on the
lessee's duty to mine.
Archer v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.. 642 P.2d 943 (Idaho 1982)
and the Alumet Trilogy (Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co., 732 P.2d
679 (Idaho App. 1986) ("Alumet I'M : Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing
Co., 812 P.2d 286 (Idaho App. 1989)("Alumet II'M : Alumet v. Bear
Lake Grazing Co., 812 P.2d 253 (Idaho 1991)("Alumet III")) are
inapplicable because they involve leases which did not contain
- 12 -
express covenants requiring the lessees to explore, develop or
mine. See Archer, 642 P.2d at 945 ("We find no express
covenant ... to mine and develop the property covered by the two
leases which the Archers now seek to rescind"); Aluraet I, 732 P.2d
at 683 ("Our review of the lease discloses no expressly stated
covenant to develop") . Similarly, none of the other mining lease
cases cited by Chief implies a covenant to mine or develop in the
face of an express covenant addressing the duty to mine. See Ionno
v. Glen-Gery Corp., 443 N.E.2d 504 (Ohio 1983); Dulin v. West, 528
P.2d 411 (Colo. App. 1974); Shoni Uranium Corp. v. Federal-Radorock
Gas Hills Partners. 407 P.2d 710 (Wyo. 1965); Taylor v. Kingman
Feldspar Co., 18 P.2d 649 (Ariz. 1933).
It is clear from the Burgin Lease that the parties entered
into an express agreement relating to the amount of work required
of the lessee. Section 5.2 of the Burgin Lease expressly provides
that until production is commenced and net smelter royalties are
payable to Chief, the lessee must spend at least $100,000 each
year for "exploration and development on or for the benefit of the
property" and that, except as to the amount of work required by
Section 5.2, the amount and character of all work shall be in the
"sole and absolute discretion of Sunshine." ("See Exhibit "A" to
Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 5 (R.851).) The Unit Lease
provides as a "Minimum Work Requirement" and a "minimum annual
obligation to expend" that the lessee must spend $100,000 each year
for exploration, development and mining of the property. (Exhibit
- 13 -
"B" to Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 8-9 (R.82 5-24) .) The
lease further provides that:
Integration of Agreement-Amendments. This
Agreement constitutes the whole agreement between the
parties. There are no terms, obligations, covenants or
conditions other than contained herein.
(Exhibit "B" to Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 24
(R.809)(emphasis added).)
Chief and South Standard agreed, in writing, to the "Minimum
Annual Work" and "Minimum Work Requirements" provisions that
expressly limited the lessees' work obligations to an expenditure
of not more than $100,000 each year. Additionally, in the case of
the Unit Lease, the parties expressly agreed in writing that the
lease agreement contained no terms, obligations, covenants or
conditions other than those expressly stated in the written lease.
In spite of their express covenants, Chief and South Standard now
claim that the court should imply an obligation to spend whatever
is required to develop and mine the Burgin Tract, and to do
whatever is necessary to produce the maximum output of ore from the
Unit Tract. This court and the Idaho Supreme Court have refused
to imply covenants or agreements that would contradict and thereby
nullify an express agreement between the parties to a contract.
Those decisions are well grounded in law and public policy, and
this court should not imply a covenant in either the Burgin Lease
or the Unit Lease that would nullify the express minimum work
provisions and impose entirely new, different and unquantifiable
work obligations on the lessees.
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Chief and South Standard expressly agreed to limit the
lessees' obligations to explore, develop and mine the Burgin and
Unit Tracts, and the lessees are entitled to judgment as a matter
of law that they have not breached any implied obligation to
explore, develop or mine the properties.
B. The district court correctly concluded that the Burgin
Lease "all funds" provision does not require the lessee to do more
exploration, development or mining work than is specifically
required by the express minimum work provisions of the leases.
Section 6.1 of the Burgin Lease provides that:
Sunshine shall provide all funds as it in its sole
mining judgment deems necessary for the exploration,
development and mining of the property.
(Exhibit "A" to Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 6
(R.850)(emphasis added).)
Chief and South Standard contend that Section 6.1 requires
the lessee to spend whatever is reasonably necessary to explore,
develop and mine the property, in spite of the express language of
Section 5.1, captioned "Minimum Annual Work", which provides that:
. . . except as to the amount of minimum annual work
required by Section 5.2 [$100,000 per year], the amount
. . . of all work shall be in the sole and absolute
discretion of Sunshine.
(Exhibit "A" to Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 5, 6 (R.851-
59) (emphasis added) .)
Section 6.1, the "all funds" section, does not create an
obligation to do more work than Section 5.1 specifically requires
because Section 5.1, the "Minimum Annual Work" section, expressly
quantifies and limits the amount of work required, and construing
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any other part of the lease to require more work would nullify the
express language of the "Minimum Annual Work" section.
Leases, like all contracts, must be construed as a whole,
giving effect to every express provision. See, e.g. , G.G.A. . Inc.
y^ Leventis, 773 P. 2d 341, 845 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (court
interpreted lease under general rules of contract construction) ;
Insurance Associates Corp. v. Hansen, 723 P.2d 190,192 (Idaho App.
1986)("a contract must be construed so as to give effect to every
part of it, if at all possible"). Any construction that nullifies
one provision as inconsistent with another should therefore be
avoided; instead, a reasonable interpretation that reconciles
apparently conflicting provisions should be adopted. See G.G.A.,
Inc-/ 773 P-2d at 845; Insurance Associates Corp.. 723 P.2d at 192;
see also 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 309 (1963); Morris v. Kadrmas, 812
P.2d 549, 553 (Wyo. 1991)("provisions which apparently conflict
must be reconciled, if such can be done by any reasonable
interpretation, before a construction is adopted nullifying any
provision").
Sections 5.1 and 5.2 obligate the lessee to spend $100,000
each year and expressly provide that the lessee has "absolute
discretion" to determine the "amount" of work, once it has spent
the required $100,000. Any interpretation of the "all funds"
provision to impose an annual work obligation of more than $100,000
would take away from the lessee the "absolute discretion" granted
by Section 5.1 and nullify that express provision.
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Section 6.1 of the Burgin Lease, properly construed, does not
create an obligation to exceed the express minimum work
requirement. Accordingly, the Defendants are entitled to judgment
as a matter of law since they have not breached any such
obligation.
c- The district court correctly concluded that the use of
the term "miner-like" in the Burgin Lease does not require the
lessee to do more work than is specifically required by the express
"Minimum Annual Work" provision of the lease.
Section 2.3 of the Burgin Lease provides that:
Chief acknowledges that during the term of this
Lease all decisions with respect to the character of
the work performed thereon by Sunshine under the terms
of this Lease shall be solely those of Sunshine, whose
only obligation to Chief in this regard is that such
work will be performed in a sound miner-like manner.
(Exhibit "A" to Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 3
(R.853)(emphasis added).)
Additionally, Section 5.1 of the lease provides that:
Section 5. Manner of Work; Minimum Annual Work.
5.1 All exploration and development work and all
mining on the property shall be performed by Sunshine in
a sound miner-like manner, and except as to the amount
of minimum annual work required by Section 5.2, the
amount and character of all work shall be in the sole
and absolute discretion of Sunshine.
(Exhibit "A" to Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 5
(R.857)(emphasis added).}
Chief and South Standard argue that the use of the term
"miner-like" in Sections 2.3 and 5.1 requires the lessee to do a
"reasonable" amount of exploration, development and mining, in
spite of the "Minimum Annual Work" provision, which expressly
- 17 -
leaves the "amount" of work in the "sole and absolute discretion"
of the lessee.
The use of the term "miner-like" does not create a work
requirement because, as Chief and South Standard concede, no court
in any jurisdiction has held that the term "miner-like" implies a
requirement to do any quantity of work. The creation of an
open-ended and unquantifiable work obligation from the use of the
term "miner-like" would nullify the express "Minimum Annual Work"
provision of the lease.
Chief and South Standard also concede that no court has held
that the word "miner-like" implies an obligation to develop mining
property, to mine any amount of ore, or to develop mining property
within any time frame. To the contrary, the courts have held that
"miner-like" speaks to the quality of the work done in a mining
project, and requires that work must be done "with due regard to
the safety, development and preservation of the leasehold." skaug
v. Gibbs, 235 P.2d 154, 157 (Wash. 1951). In at least one case a
court has held that, even though the lessee had no obligation to
mine, all operations were to be conducted in a "good workmanlike
and miner-like manner." In re Gravhall Resources. Inc., 63 B.R.
382, 383 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986).
Section 2.3, unlike Section 5.1, does not mention the
"amount" of work to be done, but instead speaks only to the
"character" of the work, saying that the lessee's obligation with
respect to the "character" of the work performed is that it "will
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be performed in a sound miner-like manner."
Section 5.1, says that "all exploration and development work
and all mining on the property shall be performed by the lessee in
a sound miner-like manner," and immediately thereafter and in the
same sentence, it says that the "amount" of the work "shall be in
the sole and absolute discretion" of the lessee "except as to the
amount of minimum annual work required by Section 5.2." Section
5.1 does not say that the lessee must do a "miner-like" amount of
work, but instead expressly leaves the amount of work in the sole
and absolute discretion of the lessee.
Leases and all contracts must be construed so that every
provision is given effect. See e.g., G.G.A., Inc. v. Leventis, 773
P.2d 341, 845 (Utah App. 1989) ; Insurance Associates Corp. v.
Hansen, 723 P.2d 190, 192 (Idaho App. 1986). As discussed in the
preceding section, Sections 5. 1 and 5.2 obligate the lessee to
spend $100,000 each year and expressly provide that the lessee has
"absolute discretion" to determine the "amount" of work, once it
has spent the required $100,000. Any interpretation of the lease's
"miner-like" provisions to create an annual work obligation of more
than $100,000 would take away from the lessee the "absolute
discretion" granted by Section 5.1 and nullify that express
provision of the lease.
The use of the term "miner-like" in Sections 2.3 and 5.1 does
not create an obligation to exceed the express minimum work
requirement, and this court should affirm the judgment of the
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district court.
D. The district court correctly concluded that the use of
the term "minerlike'1 in the "Quality of Work" section of the Unit
Lease does not require the lessee to do more work than is
specifically required by the "Minimum Work Reguirements" section of
the lease.
The Unit Lease contains sections captioned "Minimum Work
Requirements", "Quality of Work", and "Integration of Agreement."
Those sections provide that:
Minimum Work Requirements. (a) During each of
the first five years from the date hereof [the lessee
covenants] to expend on exploration, development and
mining operations the sum of $100,000 a year on such
portions of the land in the Unit Tract as it shall deem
advisable in order to determine the probability of the
presence of merchantable ores therein and to develop
and mine the same. ... Beginning in the seventh
year and continuing through the life of this lease and
any extension thereof, unless waived by the application
of the waiver clause in subparagraph 1(d) of this
Article V, [Lessee]'s minimum annual obligation to
expend shall likewise be $100,000 ....
(Exhibit "B" to Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 8-9 (R.825-
24)(emphasis added).)
Quality of Work. [Lessee covenants to] perform all
exploration, development, and mining work in the
premises leased herein in a minerlike fashion. All such
work shall at all times be under the sole control of,
and be done in accordance with, the exercise of
discretion and judgment of [Lessee] as to time, place
and method of operation.
(Exhibit "B" to Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 13
(R.820)(emphasis added.)
Integration of Agreement - Amendments. This
Agreement constitutes the whole agreement between the
parties. There are no terms, obligations, covenants or
conditions other than contained herein. No variation
thereof shall be deemed valid unless signed by the
parties representing 75% or more of the total acreage of
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the Unit Tract with the same formality as this
Agreement.
(Exhibit "B" to Sunshine•s Memorandum in Support at 24
(R.809)(emphasis added).)
Chief and South Standard argue that the use of the term
"minerlike" in the "Quality of Work" section of the unit lease
requires the lessee to spend whatever amount ultimately is
necessary to develop and mine the property, despite the parties'
express understanding to limit the work required of the lessee and
despite their express understanding that the written instrument
contains their "whole agreement."
The use of the word "minerlike" in the "Quality of Work"
section of the lease does not create a work obligation because, as
discussed in the preceding section, "minerlike" has never been
construed to require a "reasonable" amount of mining activity, and
because such a construction would nullify the intent of the parties
as expressed in the "Minimum Work Requirements" section and in the
"Integration of Agreement" section.
The Unit Lease contains both a "Minimum Work Requirements"
section and a "Quality of Work" section. The "Minimum Work
Requirements" section says that the lessee will "expend on
exploration, development and mining operations the sum of $100,000
a year" and that the lessee's "minimum annual obligation to expend
shall ... be $100,000." The "Minimum Work Requirements" section
does not use the word "minerlike." The term "minerlike" appears
only in the "Quality of Work" section of the lease. That section
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says that the lessee covenants to work "in a minerlike fashion" but
does not refer to the amount of work to be done and does not say
that the lessee must do a "minerlike" amount of work.
The captions of the "Quality of Work" section and the
"Minimum Work Requirements" section, together with the parties' use
of "minerlike" in the "Quality of Work" section, and the omission
of "minerlike" from the "Minimum Work Requirements" section,
manifest an intention that "minerlike" would apply only to the
quality of the work done, and would not apply to the amount of work
to be done. Moreover, "minerlike" has never been construed to
require any quantity of work and should not be so construed,
especially in a lease that expressly quantifies and limits the
lessee's work obligation.
The lease must be construed as a contract to give effect to
all of its terms. See, e.g., Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates,
752 P. 2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988) (contract interpretation should
harmonize all provisions and give effect to all terms); G.G.A. v.
Leventis, 773 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)(lease interpreted
under rules of contract construction). Under Utah law, a
construction that nullifies any contract provision should be
avoided "if effect can be given to both of two apparently
conflicting provisions in a reasonable reconciliation that
interpretation will control." Hardinge Co., Inc. v. Eimco Corp.,
266 P.2d 494, 495-96 (Utah 1954).
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This court can reconcile and give effect to every part of the
lease by holding that the "Minimum Work Requirements" section
establishes the lessee's minimum work obligation, that the "Quality
of Work" section governs only the quality of work, and that the
"Integration of Agreement" section means what it says: that the
written lease instrument is the "whole agreement" of the parties.
In contrast, the court cannot accept the construction advocated by
Chief and South Standard unless the court finds from the face of
the written lease that (a) the parties intended, but neglected to
say, that the lessee's obligation to spend $100,000 each year is
only part of the lessee's "Minimum Work Requirement" and "minimum
annual obligation"; (b) the parties intended, but failed, to
insert into the caption of Article V, Section 5 the words "and
quantity", so that the caption would read "Quality and Quantity of
Work"; (c) the parties intended, but neglected to say, that the
lessee must not only work in a "minerlike fashion" but must also do
a "minerlike" quantity of work; and (d) the parties did not intend
for the "Integration of Agreement" section to say that the written
lease "constitutes the whole agreement between the parties" but
instead intended the section to say that the written instrument
"constitutes most of the agreement between the parties."
The use of the term "minerlike" in Article V, Section 5 of
the Unit Lease does not create an obligation to exceed the express
minimum work requirement, and this court should affirm the judgment
of the district court.
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E- The district court correctly concluded that the Unit
Lease "all ore" provision does not require the lessee to do more
exploration, development or mining work than is specifically
required by the minimum work provision of the lease.
The Unit Lease, under the caption "Shipment and Conservation
of Ores," provides at Article V, Section 7 that the lessee agrees
to
. . . remove, insofar as practicable and consistent with good
mining practice, all commercial ore encountered in
exploration, development and mining operations in the Unit
Tract, to the end that said ores shall be preserved or
removed and shall not be wasted or left in an inaccessible
condition.
(Exhibit "B" to Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 13 (R.820).
The provision does not, as Chief claims, create an obligation to
exceed the express minimum work requirement of the lease, because
the language of Article V, Section 7 does not expressly so state.
Such an obligation would nullify the express minimum work obliga
tion of Article V, Section 1 providing that the lessee's "minimum
annual obligation to expend shall ... be $100,000 . . . ." (See
Exhibit "B" to Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 8-9 (R.825-24).)
As discussed in the preceding section, leases must be
construed as a whole, harmonizing and giving effect to every
express provision. See, e.g. , Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates,
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988); Hardinge Co., Inc. v. Eimco Corp.,
266 P.2d 494, 495-96 (Utah 1954); G.G.A.. Inc. v. Leventis. 773
P.2d 841, 845 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
There is no express requirement in Article V, Section 7 that
the lessee produce the greatest possible amount of ore during any
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time period or, for that matter, during the entire term of the
lease. There is no language in that section or anywhere else in
the lease that expressly purports to impose any manner of time
constraint or production quota on the lessee.
Article V, Section 7 cannot be construed to create a work
obligation in excess of the express minimum work obligation without
nullifying Article V, Section 1. Article V, Section 7 can,
however, reasonably be construed to harmonize and give effect to
each express provision of the lease by interpreting Section 7 to
require that, as the tract is mined, at whatever pace the lessee
elects, "ores shall be preserved or removed and shall not be wasted
or left in an inaccessible condition."
Article V, Section 7 of the Unit Lease does not create an
express or implied work obligation which exceeds the express
minimum work requirement of Article V, Section 1 of the lease. The
lessee is entitled to judgment as a matter of law since it has not
breached any such express or implied obligation.
VII. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The Burgin Lease and the Unit Lease clearly express the
intent of the parties to quantify and thereby limit the work
obligations of the lessees. Those leases cannot be construed to
create additional work requirements without disregarding the intent
of the parties as expressed on the face of each lease. Sunshine
Mining Company and HMC Mining, Inc. therefore pray that this court
- 25 -
affirm the judgment of the district court.
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APPENDIX A
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The following allegations of facts should be stricken from
Appellant's Brief:
Sunshine did not implement its 1984 Mining Plan as
scheduled. Indeed, during 1985 Sunshine cut back on
expenditures and activities at the Burgin Mine.
Brief of Appellants at 9.
The Feasibility Study concluded that it is feasible to
develop and mine the Burgin Ore Body, and the study projected
that Sunshine would receive a 26% per annum return on its
investment in the Burgin Mine. Sunshine did not implement its
1988 Feasibility Study, however, or any other plan to reopen
the Burgin Mine.
Brief of Appellants at 9-10.
The gross metallic value of the "proven and probable ore
reserves" in the Burgin Mine is approximately $400 million at
current metals prices. Sunshine has continually delayed the
implementation of its purported plans to bring the Burgin Mine
back into production. Sunshine in fact has no intention to
bring the Burgin Mine back into production without the use of
someone else's money, and then only if it can obtain a return
on its investment that is unreasonably high to demand.
Brief of Appellants at 10.
Under legal definitions promulgated by the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission, "proven and probable ore
reserves" are those mineral deposits which are established
with a high degree of assurance and which can be mined
economically (i.e. at a profit to the mining company) . See 46
Fed. Reg. 18949, Item 7A(a)(l), (2), (3). These definitions
apply_ to securities-related filings by registrants like
Sunshine who are engaged in significant mining operations.
Brief of Appellants at 10 (n. 8).
Furthermore, Sunshine has repeatedly misled Chief
regarding Sunshine's true intentions for the Burgin Mine;
Sunshine has refused to negotiate in good faith with Chief
toward the formation of a joint venture to develop the Mine;
Sunshine has mortgaged the Mine for purposes unrelated to
mining, without informing Chief; and Sunshine has converted
numerous items of mining equipment leased by Chief to
Sunshine. For example, in 1935, when Sunshine was cutting
back on its expenditures for the Burgin Mine, Sunshine was
simultaneously making optimistic representations to Chief
regarding Sunshine's intention to reopen the Mine.
Brief of Appellants at 10-11.
In 1988, Sunshine told Chief that Sunshine was committed
to commencing work on the Burgin Mine by the end of that
summer, but Sunshine did not begin the work as represented.
Brief of Appellants at 11.
Although Sunshine had indicated . . .its willingness
to confer with Chief on a partnership, Sunshine never
responded to Chief's proposal and refused even to begin
good faith negotiations with Chief. On various occasions
over the years Sunshine has removed from the Burgin Mine
numerous items of mining equipment owned by Chief.
Sunshine used some of the equipment at its out-of-state
mining operations, .... These actions constitute bad
faith and unfair dealing en Sunshine's part.
Brief of Appellants at 11.
Sunshine's acts of bad faith and its failure to bring the
Burgin Mine back into production have caused Chief injury in
the delay of royalty income that Chief would have received if
Sunshine had performed under the Lease as required.
Brief of Appellants at 11.
Shortly after Sunshine took over the Unit Lease in 1983,
the Sunshine staff completed a Three Year Operating Plan and
Budget (the "1983 Operating Plan"), which recommended a
variety of exploration, development, and mining activities on
several Unit Lease target areas. Sunshine never acted upon
the 198 3 Operating Plan, however. Between 1983 and 1988,
Sunshine's Unit Lease activities consisted of operating the
Trixie Mine on an intermittent basis at one-third or less of
its capacity, and conducting sporadic, inconclusive
exploration and development activities elsewhere within the
Unit Tract.
Brief of Appellants at 14.
The 1988 Special Report described fourteen exploration
and development targets on the Unit Tract, and concluded that
if aggressive exploration was started and maintained a
production rate of 500 to 1,000 tons per day of precious metal
bearing ore could be achieved. The 1988 Resource Inventory
identified sixteen exploration and development targets on the
Unit Tract, and described some of these targets as
"excellent."
Brief or Appellants at 14-15.
Despite the huge and excellent potential of the Unit
Tract as described in the 1983 Operating Report, the 1988
Special Report, and the 1983 Resource Inventory, Sunshine
has not undertaken any major exploration, development, or
mining activities on the Unit Tract. From 1983 through
the present, Sunshine's activities on the Unit Tract have
consistently fallen below the level of diligence that a
reasonable and faithful mining company would have
demonstrated. Sunshine has failed to exploit the full
potential of the Trixie Mine, and Sunshine has done
virtually nothing to exploit or even explore the numerous
other Unit Lease targets described in the 1983 Operating
Report, the 1988 Special Report, and the 1988 Resource
Inventory.
Brief of Appellants at 15.
Furthermore, Sunshine has concealed from Chief the true
Unit Lease rights and responsibilities of Sunshine and HMC .
. .and Sunshine has mortgaged the Unit Tract for non-mining
purposes without informing Plaintiffs. These acts constitute
bad faith and unfair dealing on Sunshine's part.
Brief of Appellants at 15.
Chief and South Standard leased their valuable lands to
Sunshine under two long term mining leases, based upon the
justifiable expectation that Sunshine would endeavor to mine
the leased properties and thereby generate production
royalties for Chief and South Standard. Sunshine has located
vast quantities of ore that hold the promise of millions of
dollars in royalties for Chief and South Standard, as well as
millions of dollars in profits for Sunshine. But Sunshine
refuses to spend the money and perform the labor that are
required to develop and mine these ores. In addition,
Sunshine has at times acted deceitfully and unfairly toward
Chief and South Standard. Sunshine's acts and omissions have
been contrary to the fundamental intent and purpose of each
Lease, and contrary to Sunshine's express and implied
covenants in each Lease.
Brief of Appellants at 16.
Sunshine has in fact determined that the funding required
for the development of the Burgin Mine is substantially
greater than that required to satisfy the minimum expenditure
clause.
Brief of Appellants at 17.
Under the circumstances of this case, a "miner-like"
level of development and mining work requires more than the
minimum level of expenditures.
Brief of Appellants at 17.
[T]he required level of performance demands more than can
be accomplished with the minimum expenditure of funds.
Brief of Appellants at 17.
Because commercial ores exist in abundance on the Unit
Tract, it is not possible to satisfy this requirement by the
mere expenditure of the minimum amount.
Brief of Appellants at 18.
Under the circumstances surrounding the Unit Lease, a
reasonable and skillful mining company would perform at a
level requiring more than the minimum expenditure.
Brief of Appellants at 18.
Sunshine cannot satisfy this implied-in-law obligation by
the expenditure of only the minimum amount.
Brief of Appellants at 18.
Sunshine's prevarications and mischief constitute breach
of the Unit Lease irrespective of Sunshine's compliance or
non-compliance with the minimum expenditure clause in the
Lease.
Brief of Appellants at 18.
"Commercial" means minable at a profit to the mining
company.
Brief of Appellants at 18.
[A]n ineffectual and unprincipled mining company is tying
up 10,000 acres of rich mining lands in Utah County. Chief
and South Standard are deprived of millions of dollars per
year in royalties deferred indefinitely, with no hope of
obtaining a good and honest lessee until at least the year
2030.
Brief of Appellants at 19.
Sunshine management insists that it will not bring the
Burgin Mine back into production unless it can obtain
development funds from a joint venturer.
Brief of Appellants at 21.
(1) It is Sunshine's mining judgment that a new mining
operation is feasible and profitable; (2) It is Sunshine's
mining judgment that $2.3 million is required for the next
phase of mine development; and (3) Sunshine proposes that a
partner should provide 63% of forward costs in return for a
50% working interest.
Brief of Appellants at 21.
The parties expressly agreed that Sunshine does not have
discretion to make decisions that result in unminer-like
performance.
Brief of Appellants at 27.
Despite Sunshine's understanding and belief that mining
the Burgin Mine would be profitable, and despite the fact that
Sunshine has had ample funds for mine development, Sunshine
has not even started to bring the Burgin Mine back into
production.
Brief of Appellants at 28.
Sunshine believes that a new mining operation is
feasible, but Sunshine proposes that it should spend only 37%
of the money necessary for the project.
Brief of Appellants at 23.
[W]hen Sunshine entered into the Burgin Lease it tacitly
promised to work vigorously on the fantastically promising
Burgin Mine project.
Brief of Appellants at 34 (n. 19).
Specifically, Sunshine has repeatedly misled Chief
regarding its intentions for the Burgin Mine. Although
Sunshine insists upon a joint venture partner as a
precondition to developing the Mine, Sunshine has refused to
negotiate in good faith with Chief toward the formation of a
joint venture. Sunshine has converted various items of leased
mine equipment belonging to Chief. Sunshine surreptitiously
mortgaged the Burgin Mine for purposes unrelated to raining the
Burgin Mine.
Brief of Appellants at 36.
Sunshine has not adequately explored, developed, or mined
the Trixie Mine or any of the numerous targets described in
the 1983 Operating Report, the 1988 Special Report, and the
19 88 Resource Inventory.
Brief of Appellants at 40.
Sunshine has failed to take miner-like steps to
adequately explore, develop, and mine the Trixie Mine and the
numerous other targets described in the 1983 Operating Report,
the 1988 Special Report, and the 1988 Resources Inventory.
Brief of Appellants at 42.
In late 1982, Kennecott suspended its mining operations
at the Trixie Mine on the Unit Tract. Shortly thereafter, Mr.
Paul Hunter, a former Kennecott employee, contacted Mr.
Leonard Weitz, Chief's President, regarding the possibility
that Mr. Hunter or a nominee company would acquire Kennecott*s
interest in the Unit Lease.
Brief of Appellants at 45.
During the course of their discussions, Mr. Hunter
described for Mr. Weitz numerous specific plans and intentions
that Mr. Hunter had for the resumption of operations at the
Trixie Mine and the processing of Trixie ores. Mr. Hunter
stated, for example, that he intended to have the Trixie Mine
fully operational on or about June 1, 1983. He also stated
that (1) HMC would acquire the Unit Lease from Kennecott, (2)
HMC would be merged into Sunshine, and (3) Mr. Hunter would be
in charge of Unit Lease operations for Sunshine, such that he
would have the power to implement his stated plans and
intentions for the Trixie Mine.
Brief of Appellants at 46.
In fact, Mr. Hunter's true plans were totally
inconsistent with his representations to Mr. Weitz.
Mr. Hunter had actually reached an agreement with Sunshine
which entailed that immediately after HMC acquired Kennecott's
Unit Lease interest, HMC would shut down the Unit Lease
property and maintain it in a standby condition for at least
six months. The agreement between Mr. Hunter and Sunshine
also entailed that Sunshine would provide the funds necessary
to maintain the Unit Lease property in a shutdown and standby
condition, because Sunshine did not intend to operate the
property in the immediate future.
Brief of Appellants at 46.
Chief relied upon Mr. Hunter's false representations by
6
giving its consent to the proposed assignment of the Unit
Lease from Kennecott to HMC. After the assignment from
Kennecott to HMC was consummated in April, 1983, HMC
immediately shut down the Unit Lease property and maintained
it in a standby condition, at Sunshine's expense. In June,
1983, Sunshine . . . took over all activity on the Unit Tract.
Neither HMC, nor Sunshine, nor Mr. Hunter ever took the steps
that Mr. Hunter said he intended to take to mine and process
the Trixie Mine ores. These circumstances constituted fraud
in the inducement of Chief's consent to the assignment of the
Unit Lease.
Srief of Appellants at 46-47.
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